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Abstract 
We demonstrate in this paper using transdisciplinary approach that the same theory of 
information asymmetry that explains the raison d’être of financial intermediaries also explains 
why financial exclusion exists. This paper synthesises some elements of theories of finance 
and economics in developing a theoretical framework towards the understanding of why 
financial exclusion exists, and appears to be widespread in lower-income countries (LICs). The 
paradigm emphasises that financial market frictions that generate information asymmetry, risk 
and transaction cost associated with lending, contribute significantly to why exclusion occurs. 
The role fiscal deficit financing that crowds-out the private sector completely plays towards 
exclusion is also emphasised. The model predicts that excessive fiscal borrowing, market 
imperfection that allows ‘arbitrage value’ to be exploited, and excessive taxation, tend to 
widen the financial exclusion gap for the private agent. In contrast, growth in income and 
private investments tend to reduce the exclusion gap, hence, inclusion stimulating. The policy 
direction is curved towards choices that will minimise the tendencies and prevalence of 
financial exclusion in economies, especially the developing world. 
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1 Introduction 
Financial inclusion which connotes participation and the use of formal financial services 
promises  welfare benefits to households (Allen, Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Pería, 2016). The 
concept thrives on the recognition that a significant section of society is excluded from 
participating in the formal financial sector, and seems to have taken centre stage on the global 
policy agenda in recent times (UNSGSA-Annual_Report, 2016). 
Though academic research works on the concept of inclusion are emerging, there is no theoretic 
proposition that seeks to provide a unified explanation to how financial exclusion occurs in the 
first place, and why it appears endemic in countries that are both economically and 
technologically challenged. Existing theoretic frameworks on the raison d’être of FIs provide 
no linkage with why financial exclusion exists.  This observed gap implies that there is the 
tendency of policies formulation that lacks theoretical basis needed to understand why financial 
exclusion exists and appears to be widespread in developing countries.  
Many theories exist in explaining why financial intermediaries exist. From the ‘information 
asymmetry and transaction cost paradigms’, ‘regulation arguments’, to the delegated 
monitoring (Diamond, 1984), and the recent, ‘risk management views’(Scholtens & van 
Wensveen, 2003), frantic attempts have been made in explaining the raison d’être of financial 
intermediaries (FIs). However, none of these theories has perceived the FI as a firm whose 
raison d’être and primary objective is to maximise profit. Besides none of these theories 
provides a clear linkage between the raison d’être of FIs and why exclusion exists. This gap is 
filled through a simple model proposition in this paper.  
The paper builds a partial equilibrium framework of financial market. The framework is in 
search of theory of financial market failure and the implication it holds for financial exclusion 
in LICs (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). The emphasis is placed on capital structure 
decision of intermediaries within the constraint of profit-maximization. The model combines 
ideas from existing theories that attempt to explain why credit constraints exists. In this, theory 
of information asymmetry, transaction cost, capital structure and neoclassical loanable fund 
theory serve as the building block. Keynesian savings/consumption model is also incorporated 
in developing this model. The purpose is to find a plausible unified explanation to an emerging 
stylised fact of the existence of significant financial exclusion in LICs. This is a first attempt 
to build such a model relevant to the understanding of: i) how financial exclusion occurs and 
ii) why it appears endemic in LICs (Atieno, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2012) where the 
performance of the financial market is imperfect. This is primarily motivated by the general 
absence of a unified model that explains the underlying phenomenon. The theory of asymmetric 
information is not only crucial to the explanation of why intermediaries exists, it is central to 
the understanding of why financial exclusion persists, especially in LICs. 
Proposition I: Financial exclusion cannot be explained outside the raison d’être of 
financial intermediaries. 
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1.1 Literature Contextualisation 
In keeping with the industrial organisation theory (Freixas & Rochet, 2008), the presence of 
market friction in the form of transactional technologies always necessitate the existence of an 
intermediary as a go-between (Allen, 1999; Williamson, 1989). Financial intermediaries (FIs) 
are specialised agents that trade in financial claims (Freixas & Rochet, 2008) by simultaneously 
buying claims issued by borrowers and selling claims to savers (Krasa and Villamil, 1992; 
Moore,1989). 
However, FIs are more than being mere traders due to the nature of their financial contracts. If 
production is the transformation of input into outputs (given technology), then FIs as 
transformers of financial contracts and securities (Fama, 1980; Gurley, Gurley, & Shaw, 1960; 
Scholes, Benston, & Smith, 1976) behave like any other producing firms. The motif is to see 
FIs as profit-motivated firms that seek to maximise returns within constraints of cost imposed 
by transaction and risks (information asymmetry). In this, the objective of financial 
intermediary (firm) is not any different from traditional profit-maximization motive that drives 
any other firm (Freixas & Rochet, 2008).  
The proposition confronts existing theories on intermediation that perceive intermediaries as 
producers of information, delegated monitors in an agency relationship (Diamond, 1984) or 
risk managers (Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003). Such suppositions confine the behaviour, 
and the raison d’être of financial intermediaries to the pursuance of interest of others (savers) 
instead of their own. Three reasons are offered to challenge the position above. 
First, depositors are not owners of the intermediary business and as such, they receive interest 
as any other creditor. For the FIs to be regarded as delegated agents (Diamond, 1984) to monitor 
borrowers on behalf of savers suggests that the latter is part or proxy owners of the venture for 
which the amount has been borrowed. Second, unlike capital market where buyers of stocks 
have the right to know and monitor the performance of the borrowing firm, the indirect 
financing involving financial intermediation operates differently. Thus, the principles of 
commercial secrecy, anonymity and confidentiality in lending require that depositors are not 
aware of who uses their fund. Thirdly, there is no contractual agreements between depositors 
and borrowers as would be expected under direct financing via the stock market. 
This framework emphasises the role of financial market friction that generate information 
asymmetry, risk and transaction costs associated with business of lending as important factors 
that explain the existence of financial exclusion.  
The risk-based theory (Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003)  argues that FIs assume risk for  
producing financial products and services. In using their owners’ initial equity capital as 
required by monetary authorities, they assume risk in view of expected returns as they add 
value.  Like any other entrepreneurial venture, meeting needs identified is key to be in business. 
In view of this, Scholtens and van Wensveen (2003) see FIs as entities that meet the needs of 
both savers and investors. Because some FIs do not accept public deposits, underscores the 
point being advanced. That is, deposit acceptance is a leveraging decision that FIs take as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for their existence. In this case, the authors posit that the 
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FIs have only one business; production and supply of financial services and products. The 
optimal capital structure decision becomes a matter of choice, just as any other firm.  
Proposition II: The primary business of FIs is to produce (supply) financial services 
and products towards profit-maximisation. 
 
2 The Model 
2.1 Production Theory of the Firm  
Neo-classical theory of production under the assumption of perfect market has been applied to 
the intermediation process (Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003). Seen as any other firm, 
intermediaries produce financial products and sell them with profit maximization as the driving 
motive (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). Under this assumption, inputs such as capital and 
labour are employed. Managers of this firm (e.g., banks) maximise profit when they are able 
to perform the function of qualitative assets transformation (QAT) (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 
1993). 
Financial intermediaries specialise in QAT when they are able to transform maturity duration, 
divisibility in terms of unit-size, liquidity and credit risk (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; 
Greenbaum, Thakor, & Boot, 2015). By transforming short-dated, fluid liabilities using the 
principle of large numbers, the intermediary’s liabilities behave as though they are long-term 
loans capable of financing long-term assets and lumpy projects (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). 
The performance of QAT function requires intermediaries to strictly apply the law of large 
number (Diamond, 1984; Freixas & Rochet, 2008; Krasa & Villamil, 1992). This law simply 
states that for equal withdrawals that occur at any given time, the intermediaries are able to 
match it with more deposits than withdrawn (Agyekum, 2011). This allows the intermediaries 
to borrow short and lend long. For deposit-taking intermediaries, the aggregated deposits 
mobilised from small savers therefore become debt-financing in their capital structure. For the 
non-deposit taking intermediaries however, the capital structure will only comprise of equity 
without debt component, unless conventional debt instruments are raised.  In view of this, 
deposit-taking intermediaries thrive on the significant information gap that exists between the 
suppliers and demanders of credit. By exploiting such information asymmetry between these 
two market players, FIs are able to transform both maturity terms and liquidity preferences of 
either side of the market. The above descriptions sum up to the  balance sheet portfolio 
management (Fama, 1983) as the prime focus of intermediary as a producer. Freixas & Rochet, 
(2008) observe however that, under the Arrow-Debreu complete market paradigm, the FI’s 
balance sheet management tends to have no effect on the real sector agents. 
Indeed, what the production theory of the firm has failed to establish is the connection to the 
capital structure of the intermediary as a firm. This failure has the tendency to push the role of 
savers in obscurity. Notably, financial intermediaries viewed as producers, may only have to 
be concerned about buyers (borrowers) of their outputs that guarantees their profitability. View 
this way, the role of savers/depositors appears less relevant.  In the light of this, capital structure 
paradigm is proposed as an extension.  
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Following Myers’ (1977) argument of ‘debt overhang’ for example, Allen and Santomero 
(1997) suggest that FIs have strong preference for internally generated fund (IGF), when 
friction in the capital market makes external financing costly. However, to avoid under 
investments, they seek external financing. Factors such as potential bankruptcy, transaction 
cost and information asymmetry, contribute to the high cost of external financing.  The 
assumptions that guide the development of our model are outlined below.  
i.) FIs, established by profit-motivated rational entrepreneurs produce financial 
services and products. 
ii.) Capital is required as an input to complement the labour necessary to supply the 
outputs (financial services). However, capital in its broader sense and in line with 
King and Levine (1993), is assumed to comprise of physical, intangible and human 
capitals. The implication is that output (loan/lending services) of the intermediary 
firm will not vary with labour but rather the quantity of funds it mobilises as public 
deposits. 
iii.) The entrepreneurs (owners) provide their initial equity capital in the form of a 
mandatory minimum capital requirement.  
iv.) The firm has the option to supply their service solely on the basis of their equity 
capital or supplement it with debt-financing. 
v.) The various debt-financing options ranked in a pecking-order based on the ease, 
convenience and cost of such capital (debt), include borrowing from; i) the public 
using deposit claim as instrument, ii) interbank money market, iii) international 
financial market; iv) and finally from the Central Bank.  To keep things simple, the 
firm’s capital structure consists of the mandatory equity capital requirement and 
the debt component in the form of public deposits mobilised. The short-term nature 
of such liabilities as acknowledged by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), requires 
special skills to transform such short maturity durations. The optimal portfolio 
choice of the firm’s capital structure is based on cost considerations underpinned 
by the risk-returns, as each of these debts options attracts interest. 
vi.) They perform the function of qualitative assets transformation (QAT) (explained 
later) and incurs transaction cost of such functions (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). 
vii.) The cost of debt is the interest that is paid on deposits, analogous of what the 
leveraged firm pays for the use of debt in their capital composition.  
viii.) The spread between the fees and other interest charged for selling their products (to 
the deficit units), and the cost of debts (interest on deposit), constitutes their profit 
(Kwakye, 2012).  
Following the viii) above, the following core assumptions are key to understanding the simple 
model postulated: 
a) There exist two different markets for credit, separated by information gap. This gap 
allows FIs to enter into two separate financial contracts that is mutually exclusive 
(Krasa and Villamil, 1992; Moore, 1989). This gap referred to as inter-market 
information asymmetry (IMIA), allows FIs to exploit arbitrage value (av) 
equivalent to interest rate spread. 
 6 Job market paper 2- 2017 
 
b)  An intermediary will borrow at rate rD from sub-market ‘A’ (for convenience, 
called Deposits Market) and repackages the borrowed amounts for onward lending 
in the other sub-market ‘B’ (Lending Market) at price rL, such that rL>rD. The FI 
closes the deal in market ‘A’, takes advantage of IMIA as there is no cross-sharing 
of information between the two sub-financial markets. The difference between rL 
and rD constitutes the spread (Kwakye, 2012). 
c) The value of the arbitrage advantage is equivalent to the risk premium the firm adds 
to the cost of debt (rD) it pays to depositors (in Market A). This indeed depends on 
depth of the IMIA, which gives rise to the transaction cost and risks that the firm 
assumes as a go-between in performing the QAT function. QAT function requires 
that the short-dated deposits from market A is repackaged and resold in market B 
in the form of long-term claims they hold from the real sector borrowers.  
d) The assumptions (a-d), presuppose that depositors who supply funds in the deposit 
market (A) are completely or partially oblivion of what goes on in market B’. 
Though asymmetry between FIs and savers is acknowledged (Freixas & Rochet, 2008), 
existing literature fails to recognise similar relationship between depositors and borrowers. We 
therefore explore this by emphasising that such information gap existing between depositors 
and borrowers is necessary not only to avoid bank run but to explain why financial 
intermediaries exist.  
Proposition III: That FIs make profits and continue to operate so long as they maintain 
the information gap between their buyers/(borrowers) and suppliers/(depositors). 
 In such a case, FIs act as arbitrage taking advantage of information gap between the markets 
to exploit economic rent (Greenbaum et al., 2015). This notion of market segmentation 
underpinned by information asymmetry, guarantees profitability of the FIs. The presence of 
spread (as an arbitrage value) suggests that the market will not clear due to the information 
gap between savers and borrowers that prevents them from meeting directly. This confronts 
the loanable fund theory which assumes that both lending and deposit rates could equilibrate.  
In support of the above observations, Krasa and Villamil (1992) as an instance, acknowledge 
that intermediaries have "two-sided" contracts  acting as borrower and lender simultaneously, 
to operationalise the two contracts. Moore (1989) also sees banks operating in two different 
retail markets; i) for bank loan and ii) for bank deposits. 
2.2 Profit Maximization as a Rationale for Financial Exclusion 
The profitability of the firm stems from the fact that their selling price (lending rate) exceeds 
the marginal cost of producing these financial services and products. This marginal costs are 
of two parts: the actual marginal operational cost of running the firms and the marginal 
opportunity cost of using depositor’s funds (interest on deposits). The potential risk of default 
posed by the problems of adverse selection and moral hazards compels banks to charge higher 
lending rate as risk premium. In LICs, non-idiosyncratic risks that come from the 
macroeconomic level such as inflation risk, exchange rate, political risks and corruption add 
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to the premium the FIs charge beyond their actual marginal cost. This is carefully modelled 
using microeconomic theoretical framework of production analysis. 
If actual marginal cost from operation is denoted  and the marginal opportunity cost of 
using depositor’s funds is  (deposit rate), then mathematically, intermediaries’ aggregate 
marginal cost of production can be expressed as: 
FI a rMC MC MC  ……………………………………………(1) 
If we define marginal benefits  as the lending rate charged on loans, then the 
intermediaries’ spread at the margin (Kwakye, 2012), is equal the difference between the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost stated as; ;  . 
In a frictionless world of no information and transaction costs, the intermediaries’ spread is 
expected to be zero (thus, MR=MC); a condition that may suggest irrelevance of 
intermediation. In the section following, the authors postulate that the existence of positive 
spread is an indication of market imperfections as a necessary condition for the existence of 
financial intermediaries. The widespread financial exclusion in most LICs generally (Hannig 
& Jansen, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015) and among small opaque borrowers is also 
attributed the significantly higher spread that market imperfections generates. This is what the 
model seeks to establish. 
Proposition IV: the raison d’être of financial intermediation is attributable to market 
imperfections that guarantee positive spread as an incentive towards profit-
maximisation. 
Specialisation and routine nature of the FIs’ work (Agyekum, 2011; Fama, 1983) coupled with 
economies of scale that characterised their operations (Greenbaum et al., 2015) ensure that the 
 is minimised. This according to Fama (1983) becomes inevitable especially when 
competition exists. In an extreme assumption of perfect and complete market information in 
an Arrow-Debreu world,  is expected to be zero. With such an assumption, the spread 
will depend on the quantum of both the marginal benefit of lending (lending interest) and 
marginal opportunity cost of using savers funds (deposit rate). This may connote strong-form 
of efficiency in the financial market (Greenbaum et al., 2015), as both lending and deposit rates 
will equilibrate. This classical world will ensure zero spread, which will signal the irrelevancy 
of financial intermediations (Freixas & Rochet, 2008).  
Typically, from Eq. (1), MBLr>MCFI, such that  .  
LR rMB MC s  ………………………………..(2) 
The assumption of frictionless market implies that  in Eq. (1). This implies that for 
the same value of , must fall to maintain equilibrium.  Consistent with the loanable 
fund complete market model, the lending and deposit rates will equate under the assumption 
of zero spread (such that s=0 in Eq. (2)). 
aMC
rMC
 LrMB
  Lr FIs MB MC    Lr a rs MB MC MC   
aMC
aMC
 0Lr FIMB MC 
0aMC 
rMC LrMB
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2.2.1 The Model without Market Frictions 
Banks as intermediaries are defined as entities whose main concern is to issue deposits and use 
the proceeds to acquire securities (Fama, 1980, 1983). This view reinforces the balance sheet 
management function of FIs (Agyekum, 2011; Freixas & Rochet, 2008).  Fama (1980) points 
out two core functions of FIs as; first, maintenance of a system of accounts in which transfers 
of wealth between surplus units and deficit spenders occur; and the second, being the skill of 
managing portfolios. Deposits seen as portfolios have returns similar to other assets of similar 
risks, especially in unregulated perfect market settings. The fees charged for managing such 
portfolios according to Fama (1980), suggests that there is no opportunity cost. However, 
financial intermediaries in practice, offer interest to depositors and do incur other transaction 
cost of replenishing deposits (e.g., publicity cost). 
For profit-maximising FI (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993), total profit is determined by 
difference between total revenue and total cost. Total revenue is assumed to be derived from 
lending transaction (TL), defined as the volume (quantity) of securities purchased (or monies 
lent out). Total cost depends on Deposit Transaction (TD), that is volume (quantity) of deposit 
mobilised.  
Existing literature admit the presence of transaction cost of rendering financial services. For 
example, Fama (1983) admits there are both transaction cost: (i) of ensuring that ‘a depositor’ 
who effects payment via accounting system (e.g., cheque) has adequate funds to cover such 
transactions; and (ii) when FIs execute exchange of claims in which assets are sold or 
purchased. If the FIs’ lending and deposit rates are given as , and  respectively, then a 
simple expression for total revenue, total cost and total profit for the profit-maximising 
intermediary, can be obtained as: 
TC= FC+VC(qT)…………………………....(3) 
( ) ( )qT qTC FC VC  ………………………..(3a) 
           ( )
T
qT LTR r Q ………………….....…………(4);  
where is the lending rate (price charged for rending financial services), and QT is quantity 
of financial (lending) transactions.  The total cost function i.e., Eq. (3a) can be rewritten as;  
( )
T
qT DC K r Q  …….....…………………..(4b); 
where  is the deposit rate and K is fixed cost.   
In keeping with Arrow-Debreu world of complete market, the following assumptions further 
guide the development of the model: i) No transaction cost of mobilising deposit 
(administrative cost, publicity, etc.); ii) Perfect and costless flow of information to all financial 
market actors, with no market frictions; and iii) Proxy Law of large numbers applies. Thus, at 
any given point, the amount of average deposit mobilised exceeds the combined amount of 
monies withdrawn by savers, and or the amount lent out to borrowers such that 
; where , denote amounts deposited, lent, and withdrawn 
respectively. 
Lr Dr
Lr
Dr
 ( )D L WQ Q Q  an   , d,D L WQ Q Q
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Total Profit function is then specified as; 
( ) ( ) ( )T TQT Q Q
TR TC       (5);  
where  is total profit, TR is total revenue and TC2 is total cost. The profit function that is 
maximised subject to cost constraints is given as; 
( ) ( )
T T
QT L Dr Q K r Q        (5a) 
Applying first order (FOC) for profit maximisation given as; 
 
0L D L Dr r r r    …………………………(6)
3 
The Eq. (6) simply says that in an ideal world of perfect, frictionless financial market4, bank’s 
lending rate (marginal benefit) will be exactly equal to its deposit rate (marginal opportunity 
cost). The bank faces no risk and therefore only normal (zero economic) profit is permissible 
in the long-run, as predicted under the perfect market paradigm (Frank & Parker, 1991, pp 355-
360; Kaldor, 1934; Mueller, 1986). This outcome accords well with that obtained by Freixas 
and Rochet, (2008) under the Arrow-Debreu assumption. 
2.2.2 Profit-maximisation under Market Frictions 
The utopian world of Walrasian equilibrium (Gul & Stacchetti, 1999; Hahn, 1978, 1980; 
Smale, 1976) that promises utmost efficiency, seems theoretically ideal though practically 
impossible. Indeed, in the Arrow-Debreu world of efficient financial resource allocation (Allen 
& Santomero, 1997; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003), the role 
of intermediation is needless as savers and borrowers can interact on a market at virtually no 
cost. Even in the stock market where information is assumed to flow freely across the market 
spectrum, the existence of brokerage fee and other charges confront the zero-transaction cost 
assumption.  
Below, the assumptions of perfect information and costless transaction are being relaxed. This 
allows for information entropies that generate transaction costs of rendering financial services. 
For instance, Allen and Santomero (1997) admit that depositors incur both initial fixed 
component of participation cost and marginal cost of monitoring the performance of their 
assets. However, FIs assume such costs in performing the monitoring function on behalf of 
investors. Moreover, Myers (1977) also admits that a firm’s debt policy may mirror the 
                                                          
2 (Going forward C will be used in place of TC, for convenience). 
3 Notice that 
( )TL
T
d r Q
dQ
is the marginal revenue (MRFS), and 
( )Td
T
d K r Q
dQ

is the MCFS, and that the K (Eq.4.4a) 
which is the fixed cost component disappears, applying the constant rule for differentiation.   
 
4 with neither information entropy nor transaction cost of rendering financial services 

( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )
0
T T T T
qT L D L D
T T T T
d d r Q K r Q d r Q d K r Q
dQ dQ dQ dQ
   
   
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imperfection. In line of the above, transaction cost component is now introduced into the 
previous model. The resultant variable cost function now specified as;  
 
( ) ( )
T
qT DVC Q r       (7); 
where capturing the transaction cost per output. Substituting Eq. (7) into (3a) yields,  
( ) [ ( )]
T T
qT L Dr Q K Q r          (8);  
satisfying the FOC for maximisation, produces;  
( )
' ( ) 0T L DQ r r        
*
L Dr r       (8a) 
From Eq. (8a) the marginal cost increases additively by the . Eq. (4.8a) suggests that presence 
of information and transaction cost contributes significantly to the lending rate charged by FIs. 
‘Ceteris paribus’, increase in information asymmetry generates transaction cost per financial 
service of , which directly reflects in an increased lending rate. Because represents an 
incremental cost of rendering financial services beyond deposit rates ( ) (under the frictionless 
model), it could be regarded as the premium required by intermediaries. Greenbaum et al. 
(2015) admits liquidity premium for transforming maturity duration of assets must be present 
for FIs to continue to exist. They argue further that when such premium reduces to marginal 
transaction cost of performing QAT (i.e., rD), the incentive for FIs to exist disappears. The 
present paradigm however considers risk premium in its entirety other than the liquidity risk 
premium suggested.  
The actual composition of the is worth highlighting. Being a proxy risk premium, the 
composition may include actual administrative and overhead cost, search cost (e.g., publicity), 
as well as premium to cater for risk such as default, political, inflation, volatility, and other 
macroeconomic uncertainties. In the words of Kwakye (2012) “the lending rate (i.e. cost of 
credit) to an individual borrower usually includes considerations regarding specific risks 
associated with the borrower as well as profitability of the intermediary”. Technological 
deepening may reduce search and administrative costs components of the transaction cost 
(Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003), especially for advanced economies where such 
innovations exist. 
The following policy implications can be deduced; 
i. A rise in due to information opacity that leads to high transaction cost of serving 
SMEs/households, requires that lending rate ( ) also rises, to maintain the 
optimality (i.e., to satisfy the maximisation) condition. 
ii. Given ,  the intermediaries will demand for collateral (as non-price barrier) whose 
value at margin must be equivalent to .  
iii. In advanced economies (e.g. OECDs), inflation, political and default risks tend to 
be very minimal. This coupled with the reality of technological advancements, 
potentially reduces transaction cost of rendering financial services (Scholtens & van 


 
Dr


*
Lr
*
Lr

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Wensveen, 2003). The implication for the ‘ ’ in Eq.8a, is to predict its closeness 
to zero in technologically and economically advanced economies. Consequently, 
cost of capital ( ), especially to the SMEs and poor households is expected to be 
low, hence low incidence of exclusion. 
iv. The converse is expected in the LICs where information asymmetry and financial 
market frictions translate into high political, inflation and default risks. This, 
exacerbated by the general lack of technological advancements, means that higher 
value of  is expected to feed into a higher cost of capital (i.e., ). Significant 
financial exclusion is therefore expected. 
All these predictions postulated in this framework, have implication for small borrowers in 
developing economies. Thus, small businesses and household sector who mostly operate with 
much opacity and obscurity (Berger & Udell, 2006; De la Torre et al., 2010; Vos et al., 2007), 
will be financially excluded, either through price-based (high cost of borrowing) credit-
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), or non-price barriers such as collateral requirements.  
2.2.3 Reconciling the Present Paradigm with the Conventional Theory of Finance 
It is conceivable to reconcile the above proposition (Eq.8a) with the standard capital asset 
pricing theory in traditional finance. Allen and Santomero (1997) advocate for integration 
between intermediation theories and asset pricing theories. 
To start with, let assume that banks will offer their savers interest that is equivalent to the risk-
free rate. This is consistent with the view that bank deposits are portfolio assets with minimal 
risk (Black, 1970; Fama, 1980; Johnson, 1968). Deposits as a debt-like security tend to have 
low marginal participatory cost as there may be no need to monitor such assets (Allen & 
Santomero, 1997).  Fama’s (1983) assertion that, fees charged by banks in a competitive 
environment, constitute their marginal cost of rendering transaction and portfolio management 
services. Allen and Santomero (1997) also observe that the practice of monitoring financial 
market to determine the kind of adjustments required on a given portfolio on day-to-day basis, 
gives rise to the existence of significant marginal costs. 
If we assume that the probability of FIs defaulting is low due to the possibility of bailout in an 
event of bankruptcy, then it is plausible to conjecture that the in Eq. 8(a) will be closer to the 
risk-free rate (rf) offered on government securities. Under such assumption therefore, the cost 
of capital (lending rate) is simply the *
L fr r   ……………………..(9): (where f Dr r  in 
Eq.8(a) is the risk-free rate expected on treasury securities, and as the risk premium as noted 
earlier). The Eq. 9 thus, becomes the unweighted average cost of capital. Unweighted because, 
beta that measures how a change in the market conditions (transaction/information and other 
components of the risk premium) affects the cost of capital is assumed to be one (1). 
Introducing accounting beta ( ) into the equation (9), leads to the traditional cost of capital 
theory in Eq. 10, given below; 

*
Lr
 *Lr
Dr


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*
L fr r                   (10) 
 We thus impose restriction on the value of the beta , but would generally assume that 
it falls between zero (0) and one (1). Can we reasonably expect the beta to be close to zero for 
advanced economies and close to one for LICs? 
2.3 Crowding-Out Effects (COE) and Financial Exclusion: The Missing Component 
of the Loanable Fund Theory 
One important theoretical prediction of the Neo-classical theory of loanable fund is the issue 
relating to crowding-out effects. The theory argues that the financial market will clear and 
establish an equilibrium interest rate that will be acceptable to both savers and borrowers (see 
figure 1). Government’s intervention therefore leads to distortion in the loanable fund market. 
Unlike the private sector firms that borrow to invest, the government borrows when it has 
deficit budget to finance; what is also known as public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR). 
The reality of PSBR means that government outcompetes and crowds-out the private sector 
firms on loanable funds market (Kwakye, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1:  Equilibrium on the Neoclassical Loanable Fund Market 
Two problems are identified with the loanable fund paradigm. First the assumption that lending 
rate will equate the deposit rate at equilibrium, makes no room for the possibility of interest 
rate spread. Second, the theory fails to acknowledge the residual effect of rise in the interest 
rate on private consumption.  
In contrast, the current model proposition rectifies these two gaps. It is to be noted that as the 
government offers higher interest on its securities, households are motivated to inter-
0 1 
ep 
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Supply of Funds 
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                    ( )p pI SF            Loanable Fund 
e
pr   
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temporally allocate their wealth between current and future consumptions (savings). For a 
given disposable income, the rise in savings in response to the higher interest offering on 
treasury securities is possible only when current consumption is sacrificed. The total crowding 
out effect of PSBR is the combined reduction of domestic private investment and domestic 
households’ consumption. Within the Keynesian paradigm, both effects lead to reduction in the 
equilibrium gross domestic productivity (GDP), and hence national income.  
Note that ;  where is the disposable income, S is savings and C is 
Consumption. 
From Figure 2 the gap   (PSBR) represents the total crowding out effects which is 
decomposed into the effect on reduced private investment and rising domestic private savings, 
which ultimately causes consumption to shrink ‘pari-passu’, due to the mirror relationship. 
 
Figure 2:  Showing the Complete Crowding-Out Effect of PSBR 
The same gap is the difference between quantity of savings (loanable fund) supplied  and 
the domestic private investment, . 
( ) ( )Sp IpPSBR F F   
Thus, , which is simply given as: 
( ) ( )Sp IpPSBR F F    (11). 
For simplicity, we drop ‘F’ so that investment and savings stands out in the above Eq. (11) 
distinctly 
p pPSBR S I  ………(11a). Eq. (11/a) defines the total crowding-out effects, 
which is being considered as financial exclusion. 
d
Y S C 
d
Y S C   
ab
a b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supply of Funds 
(Private Savings) 
         ( )pIF       ( )p pI SF      ( )pSF       Loanable Fund 
ep 
eg 
e
pr   
e
gr   
PSBR 
  I   S  
o 
Total Crowding Out Effects 
(Decomposed into 
p pI S   ) 
( )SpF
( )IpF
( ) ( )Ip SpCOE F F 
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2.4 Formal Treatment of the Complete Crowding-out Effects Model and Implication 
for Financial Inclusion 
The mirror relationship between consumption and savings functions allows the latter to be 
derived from the former. Savings is unconsumed disposable income. Consumption function 
from the Keynesian paradigm is given as 
0
dC bY   ………………….(12)5; which is not 
sensitive to interest rate nor PSBR. However, the autonomous consumption  which mirror-
transforms into dis-savings (debt or negative savings) ( ) could suggest that Keynes had in 
mind the possibility of individuals borrowing to consume at zero disposable income. Because 
people can borrow to augment their current income to smoothen consumption, it is rational to 
expect the consumption function to be sensitive to the interest rate. As indicated earlier, PSBR 
has effect on household’s current savings via consumption. In modifying Eq.12 to reflect the 
impact of both interest rate and PSBR, yields consumption function given as Eq. (13). 
 
d
pC bY ar PSBR       (13);  
Deriving the savings function from Eq. 13 using the disposable income-consumption identity 
below: 
dY S C   
dS Y C                  (14) 
  
( )d d pS Y bY ar PSBR      (1 )
d
pS b Y ar PSBR                   (15) 
Domestic private investment demand is expressed as a function of interest rate, (i.e., cost of 
credit) such that . The actual private investment demand function is given as Eq. 16, 
below;  
0pI I r                    (16); 
 where is interest elasticity of investment demand and  is autonomous component of the 
demand function. 
                                                          
5  Note: Yd is disposable income, a0-autonomous consumption and b- Keynesian Marginal Propensity to 
consume(MPC). 
0a
0a
( )pI f r
 0I
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From Eq. 11, i.e., the crowding-out effect equation, we can derive the interest rate, which 
reflects the reality of financial exclusion that is likely to be caused by PSBR. Substituting Eq.13 
and Eq.14 into Eq. 11(a); 
p pPSBR S I  ………(11a). Eq. (11a) recalled. 
 
 
 * 0
(1 ) (1 )
( )
d
P
PSBR I b Y
r

 
   


      (17) 
Note that interest elasticity of savings/consumptions ,  interest elasticity of investment 
, marginal propensity to consume and consumptions/savings sensitivity to fiscal borrowing 
 are all ratios, such that we can accordingly impose the restriction; , (i.e., 
each falling between zero and one).  
Against this therefore, the following policy outcome can be deduced: 
1. ; i.e., the complete crowding effect of fiscal domestic borrowing. 
This depends on savings/consumption sensitivity to fiscal borrowing (γ), interest 
sensitivity to both savings ( ) and to investment demand ( ). Crowding out effect 
(COE) due to PSBR widens the financial exclusion gap, as it causes rise in the lending 
interest rate to private sector borrowers. 
2. ; An exogenous increase in private sector investment demand will 
cause a rise in interest rate, if savings remains the same. Though interest rate rises, this 
does not lead to financial exclusion as the rise is caused and accompanied by investment 
rise rather than either PSBR or financial market frictions. 
3. . The model predicts that increase in 
national output (GDP) will cause an exogenous fall in lending rate as savings rises. For 
a given marginal propensity to save, rise in income translates into a rise in people’s 
0[(1 ) ] ( )
d
pPSBR b Y r PSBR I r       
0
0
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
d
p p
d
p
PSBR b Y r PSBR I r
PSBR I b Y r
  
  
     
     
( ) ( )
( )b
( ), 0 , , , 1b   
*
(1 )
0
( )
p
PSBR
r 
  




 
0
*
1
0
( )
p
I
r
  
 

*
0; 0
(1 )
( ) ( )
L
Y
r b MPS
    
    

 
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disposable income and hence savings. Given the same investment demand curve, the 
cost of credit is expected to fall, in a way that allows more firms to borrow cheaply. 
This will reduce the exclusion gap as inclusion is induced. Thus, policy towards growth 
in domestic productivity will be an inclusion engendering. This again predicts that cost 
of credit in advanced economies with high income, will be lower than LICs where 
income and productivity are low (see, for example, Beck, Demirgiiç-Kunt, and Martinez 
Peria 2007 and Cull, Demirgiiç-Kunt, and vMorduch 2013). 
In its structural equation forms illustrated on the Figure 1, income behaves exogenously and 
will cause a shift in the savings supply curve. However, reconciling the reduced forms with the 
I-S model (which shows an equilibrium in the real sector for a given interest rates and income), 
GDP then becomes an endogenous variable (see Eq. 23a). 
 
Note that the in Eq. (17) is the cost of credit that real sector private agents pay for borrowing 
from the financial system. This is the same as the lending rate defined in Eq. (9). If we 
simply assume that savings/consumption is not responsive to PSBR, such that then Eq. 
17 becomes, * 0
(1 )
( )
d
P
PSBR I b Y
r
 
  


……………….(17a) ; in which case the crowding-out 
effect will be similar to point (2) above (i.e., ). 
2.4.1 Model with Information Asymmetry and Transaction Cost 
It has been established earlier that financial market frictions that give rise to information 
asymmetry and transaction cost do not allow equality between lending rate and deposit rates. 
The presence of spread constituting the arbitrage value ( ) serves as an incentive for the 
continual operation of FIs.  Recall from Eq. (10),  *
L Dr r  
*
D Lr r       (10a); 
Substituting Eq. (10a) into Eq. (15), gives; 
(1 ) d DS b Y ar PSBR                  (15) recalled. 
                     
*(1 ) ( )d LS b Y a r PSBR       
*(1 ) d LS b Y ar a PSBR                                    (18) 
Substituting Eq. (18) and Eq. (16) into Eq. (11a), and solving for , produces Eq. (19) below: 
*
pr
*
Lr
( 0), 
* 0 1 ( ) 0p PSBRr      

*
Lr
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* 0(1 ) (1 )
( )
d
L
PSBR I b Y
r
 
 
    


    (19) 
From Eq. 19, we can ascertain the impact of market friction and imperfection on cost of 
credit to the firm. 
4. ; Thus, risk premium and transaction cost that exist due to 
information asymmetry will cause cost of credit ( ) to the private sector to rise. 
Consequently, the market will financially exclude many firms as it rations credit from 
those who cannot afford the risk-adjusted interest rate. This seems consistent with credit 
rationing paradigm of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).   
The Neo-classical assumptions of perfect and complete information, no market friction and no 
fiscal intervention in the credit market can be incorporated in the current model. This leads to 
optimal allocation of financial resources. The entire household savings will be channelled 
towards the domestic private sector for investment at a rate acceptable to both borrowers and 
savers. That mimics a strong-form of market efficiency (Greenbaum et al., 2015).  Under such 
circumstances, the QAT role of financial intermediation will be needless (Greenbaum et al., 
2015) as equilibrium interest rate drives away arbitrage value (interest rate spread). This 
prediction is obtainable when with the absence of fiscal deficit  and financial 
market friction ( ), Eq. 19 simply becomes:  
* 0 (1 )
( )
d
L
I b Y
r
 
 


…………………………..(20); which can be rearranged back into savings 
equal investment model as done below; 
* *
0(1 )
d
L L
Sp Ip
r b Y I r         (21) 
0
0
[(1 ) ] ( )
(1 )
d
L L
d
L L
PSBR b Y r PSBR I r
PSBR b Y r PSBR I r
   
   
      
      
0(1 ) (1 ) ( )
d
LPSBR I b Y r         
( )
*
0
( )
Lr


 
 

*
Lr
( 0)PSBR 
0 
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Note that unlike the Keynesian model, the Classicalist did not explicitly recognise disposable 
income as a key determinant of savings. Eq. 21 therefore will be the Neo-classical ideal of 
perfect market functioning illustrated on Figure 1. 
2.4.2 Model with Tax and the implication of Financial Inclusion Policy 
Finally, we now examine the model when tax is directly incorporated. It could be seen from 
the previous equations that the role of tax was implicit through the disposable income (Yd). As 
tax is directly incorporated in the model, it allows the effect of fiscal policy on financial 
inclusion to be determined. The disposable income definitional identity as noted earlier, is 
income less direct tax; thus; Yd=Y-T. …………..…..(22); Substituting Eq. 22 into Eq. 19, we 
obtain; 
* 0 0(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
L
PSBR I b Y b T
r
 
 
      


                    (23) 
 
5. ; Tax imposition causes lending rate to rise as 
household savings fall in response to a fall in their disposable income. Increase in taxes 
as an austerity measure therefore widens the financial exclusion gap, as some firms will 
not be able to access credit due to rise in cost of credit. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Policy Predictions of the Model, and Implication for Financial 
Inclusion 
# Model Outcome Policy Tool Impact on Financial 
Inclusion 
1.  
 
Fiscal borrowing (PSBR) and 
Crowding Out Effects 
Hampers inclusion 
(see Kwarkye, 2012) 
2.  
 
Exogenous Increase in Private 
Investment 
Neutral Outcome 
3.  
 
Financial Market imperfection and 
Information Asymmetry 
Hindering Inclusion 
(see e.g., Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981) 
0
*
0; 0
(1 )
( ) ( )
L
T
r b MPS
    
   

 
*
(1 )
0
( )
L
PSBR
r 
  




0
*
1
0
( )
L
I
r
  
 

*
0
( )
Lr


 
 

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5.  
 
Excessive Taxation Inclusion-hampering  
5.  
 
Growth in national income and 
productivity 
Inclusion Stimulating 
(See e.g., Allen, et. 
Al, Pería, 2016) 
 
Note: If we assume that  , , and
then the reduced form of Eq. (4.1.9) can simply become 
*
0 1 2 0 3 0 4( )Lr PSBR I Y T           ………(23a), which can be estimated as a linear 
model. 
In line with Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), technology can 
only reduce transaction cost as it addresses the ex-ante form of informational asymmetry 
(adverse selection), hence reduction in   .  Indirect effect of technology on the interim (moral 
hazard) or the ex post (costly state verification) information asymmetry can be assumed 
(Kwakye, 2012; Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003). 
   
3 Conclusion 
Harmonising and drawing synergies from existing economics and finance theories, new 
paradigm emerges that offers a unified explanation to why financial exclusion seems a natural 
outcome of structurally malfunctioned financial systems.  
The model predicts that information technology, efficient national governance system and 
much freer economic environment that help minimise the existence of information asymmetry 
and transaction cost are key towards broader financial inclusion. The proposition holds the key 
towards policy-formulation that will minimise the tendencies and prevalence of financial 
exclusion in economies, especially the less developed countries (LDCs). This paradigm holds 
the key in ensuring that policy prescription towards inclusive financial system by donor 
agencies, are focused on where impact could be maximised. 
 
 
 
0
*
0
(1 )
( )
L
T
r b
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

*
0
(1 )
( )
L
Y
r b
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

3(1 ) ( )b      1(1 ) ( )      21 ( )   
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Appendix: 
A. Equilibrium Analysis in Sub-Market A; Deposits Market  
i. An Inverted Kinked Demand Curve for the FI. 
Starting from the assumption that suppliers of fund (Savers/depositing public) have no market power 
and are price-takers. In such case, we could assume that they face a near perfectly elastic supply curve 
(SD). However, the presence of other competitive deposit-mobilisers and strategic savers (e.g., 
institutional) who have some power to negotiate for a higher deposit rate makes perfectly elastic supply 
curve unrealistic. Ceteris paribus, it is conceivable to assume that saver’s behaviour generally mimics 
price-taking, as decision to save or not is often determined exogenously by other factors other than 
interest (price) on deposits intermediaries offer. As an instance, Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb, and Corsetti 
(1992) in their cross-country study on determinant of household saving in developing countries did not 
find interest rate as a significant determinant. Similarly, Harris, Loundes, and Webster (2002) find very 
little or no impact of interest rate on household’s propensity to save in Australia. Ironically, where 
influence exists, they tend to be negligible but negative. They argued in line with life cycle hypothesis 
of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) that desired to smoothen intertemporal consumption over lifetime, 
makes wealth and income emerge as positive and robust determinants.  
On the demand side, an inverted kinked demand curve for the deposit-mobilising financial market is 
postulated. As can be seen in the diagram below, FIs though have control over their deposit rates, they 
do not face perfectly inelastic demand curve due to the presence of competitors. The supposition of an 
inverted kinked demand curve has two implications: i) deposit rate will not be influenced by exogenous 
shift in supply of deposits, at least within the horizontal range; and ii) deposit rate (rD) will rise when 
there is a significant shock to supply of funds, or when demand for deposit increases. The deposit rate 
appears rigid-downwards and flexible-upwards due to the nature of the supply curve. A rise in demand 
for deposits will occur only when fund suppliers (savers) have been offered a higher deposit rate as an 
incentive to forgo current consumption. Besides, for deposit-taking rational FI who faces daily liquidity 
constraints in its treasury management, there is no reason to expect demand for deposit to fall. Demand 
being rigid downwards, renders the horizontal portion of the SD curve irrelevant. 
 
Figure A1: Equilibrium Condition in the Deposits Side of the Intermediation 
Business 
The possibility that deposit rate (rD) may rise in response to a significant fall in supply of deposits 
compelling the FIs to offer a higher deposit rate to attract savers arises (See figure 4.4 A). The actual 
kinked demand curve with the horizontal mid-portion is the recognition that FIs are generally reluctant 
in adjusting their deposit rate offerings, ‘ceteris paribus’. Within the horizontal mid-range, the FIs 
behave as price takers who are willing to mobilise as much deposits (at least within that range) as 
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possible without reducing the interest rate (rD). Even with upward-sloping supply curve, depositors’ 
ability to influence the deposit rate is dampened partially by the nature of the FI’s demand curve. 
This proposition contradicts deposit demand curve postulated by  Moore (1989), who assumes that 
banks face upward-sloping demand for credit because deposit demand is positively related to the 
deposit rate offered.  
It is to be noted that an exogenous increase in demand for deposits caused, for instance, by increased 
market competition, will cause a rise in the deposit rate (rD). The nature of the supply curve suggests 
that fall in demand for deposit will not exert downwards pressure on deposit rate. After all, why would 
a deposit-taking FIs decrease demand for deposits, in the first place? It is rationally inconceivable! The 
flat mid-portion of the demand curve as noted earlier, suggests that FIs have insatiable demand for 
deposits. Their demand curve slopes downward at some point to underscore the presence of market 
competition and their market power. 
The broken portion is an admission that FIs though can and may want to offer much lower interest on 
deposits, doing so may not be in their interest as their competitors may not follow suit. Depending on 
cross-price elasticity of demand between their services offering and that of other rival intermediaries, 
substitution may prevent FIs from attempting to reduce the deposit rate below some point. Unlike the 
traditional kinked demand in an oligopolistic model (Baumol, 1977; Maskin & Tirole, 1988) which 
assumes a unique-price solution, the current (inverted-kinked) model posited here, brings flexibility to 
that rigid assumption.   
 
B. Equilibrium Analysis in Sub-Market B; The FI’s Lending Market  
In contrast to Moore (1989) who admits that banks operate in two retail markets but fails to analyse 
these market separately, the current paradigm assumes separate sub-markets exist latently for both retail 
loans and deposits markets. 
The model is built on the assumption that real sector private firms are demanders for credits, while the 
FIs become the suppliers. FIs face perfectly elastic supply curve for credit as they would, in theory, 
wish to supply borrowers with credit at an established lending rate (rL). 
The real sector firms (borrowers) face the usual downward-sloping demand curve, reflecting the fact 
that higher lending rate (cost of borrowing) discourages them from borrowing more. 
The horizontal supply curve for credit has the following implications: 
i. Increase or decrease in demand caused by exogenous pressures will not affect the 
lending rate (rL). 
ii. Exogenous factor that causes either an increase (excess liquidity) or a decrease 
(constrained liquidity) in supply of credit affects the lending rate.  
This is illustrated in the diagrams below. 
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Figure A2  Market Equilibrium for the Lending Sub-financial Market 
The conclusion from the above assumptions is that in a perfect and complete market without transaction 
costs and risk of lending (credit or lending risk), the ‘av’ will be zero. In such a world, there would not 
be any role for the intermediaries as surplus spending units and deficit spenders can meet. In such case, 
both borrowers (real private sector investors) and savers can borrow and save respectively at an 
equilibrium interest rate that is Arrow-Debreu-Pareto optimal and efficient.  This would be similar to 
the Neo-classical paradigm of loanable fund theory which assumes that supply is able to meet with 
demand to establish equilibrium interest rate. 
In essence, the new paradigm being proposed does not only contradicts the Neo-classical theory of 
loanable funds, but most importantly brings the practical reality of the existence of interest rate spread 
within the financial sector. The model also predicts that the spread will be relatively higher in 
developing economies with considerable structural constraints and institutional bottlenecks. As noted 
earlier, the advanced (e.g. OECD) economies that have overcome such structural constraints, the 
interest rate spread is expected to be low. 
The ultimate prediction is that higher interest rate spread that reflects the underlying risk, information 
gap and transaction cost are key contributory price factors that lead to financial exclusion within an 
economy. This is in agreement with credit-rationing hypothesis of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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